基于政府补贴的随机产出与需求农产品供应链优化决策

doi:10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2017.03.010

中国科学技术大学学报 ›› 2017, Vol. 47 ›› Issue (3): 267-273.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2017.03.010

• 研究论文:管理科学与工程 • 上一篇下一篇

基于政府补贴的随机产出与需求农产品供应链优化决策

聂腾飞，宇海锁，杜少甫

中国科学技术大学管理学院，安徽合肥 230026

收稿日期:2016-03-16 修回日期:2016-05-30 接受日期:2016-05-30 出版日期:2023-03-27 发布日期:2016-05-30
通讯作者: 杜少甫
作者简介:聂腾飞,男, 1986年生, 博士. 研究方向：供应链管理.E-mail: ntf1986@ustc.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金（71571171）, 中国博士后科学基金（2014M561840）资助.

Agriculture supply chain optimization based on supply and demand uncertainty with government subsidy policies

NIE Tengfei, YU Haisuo, DU Shaofu

School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China

Received:2016-03-16 Revised:2016-05-30 Accepted:2016-05-30 Online:2023-03-27 Published:2016-05-30

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在农产品生产和需求随机的背景下，并基于政府对零售商的税收补贴政策，研究在只有一个生产商和一个零售商的情况下的供应链的优化决策问题.生产商和零售商之间存在Stackelberg博弈，并且证明了存在唯一的Stackelberg均衡解.研究结果表明，政府补贴政策能够增加供应链的整体利润.此外，在合理的政府补贴政策以及外生参数下，批发价格契约具有协调供应链的可能性，这不同于传统供应链中批发价格契约不能协调供应链.

关键词: 政府补贴, 生产需求随机, 批发价格契约, 供应链协调

Abstract: Under the background of random output and random market demand of agriculture, and with government subsidies for the retailer, a one-period two-echelon supply chain optimization consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer was studied. A Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer was considered, and the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium was derived. The results show that the government subsidy policy can improve the supply chain’s total profit. In addition, an interesting finding shows that, under the reasonable government subsidies and exogenous parameters, the supply chain can be coordinated with a simple wholesale price contract, which does not happen in traditional cases.

Key words: government subsidy, random yield and demand, wholesale price contract, supply chain coordination

中图分类号:

TP391

聂腾飞, 宇海锁, 杜少甫. 基于政府补贴的随机产出与需求农产品供应链优化决策[J]. 中国科学技术大学学报, 2017, 47(3): 267-273.

NIE Tengfei, YU Haisuo, DU Shaofu. Agriculture supply chain optimization based on supply and demand uncertainty with government subsidy policies[J]. Journal of University of Science and Technology of China, 2017, 47(3): 267-273.

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基于政府补贴的随机产出与需求农产品供应链优化决策

Agriculture supply chain optimization based on supply and demand uncertainty with government subsidy policies

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