Journal of University of Science and Technology of China ›› 2017, Vol. 47 ›› Issue (11): 929-939.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2017.11.008
• Research Articles:Management Science and Engineering • Previous Articles
Online:
Published:
Abstract: Based on evolutionary game theory, a game model between local governments and power generation enterprises was constructed, and then the dynamic stability and evolution trend were analyzed. The analysis result suggests that there exist some different equilibria in the evolution of the game system when the expected profits of enterprises are changing. Accordingly, local governments need to take some measures, for example, strengthening incentives to enterprises who actively abide by emission reduction polices, increasing carbon trading prices appropriately, reducing the variance of cost when local governments choose strict regulation or loose regulation, and strengthening public supervision of the governments, so as to urge the power generation enterprises to consciously reduce carbon emissions, thus achieving control over the overall carbon emissions.
Key words: energy saving and emission reduction, carbon trading mechanism, evolutionary game, power generation enterprises, local governments
CLC Number:
F062
XU Jingzhi, DONG Yu. Evolutionary game analysis between local governments and power generation enterprises based on carbon trading mechanism[J]. Journal of University of Science and Technology of China, 2017, 47(11): 929-939.
0 / / Recommend
Add to citation manager EndNote|Ris|BibTeX
URL: http://just-cn.ustc.edu.cn/EN/10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2017.11.008
http://just-cn.ustc.edu.cn/EN/Y2017/V47/I11/929