基于Shapley值公平参考框架的供应链优化

doi:10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2015.06.011

中国科学技术大学学报 ›› 2015, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (6): 497-506.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2015.06.011

• 论著 • 上一篇

基于Shapley值公平参考框架的供应链优化

朱丽丽，时育成，朱贾昂，杜少甫

中国科学技术大学管理学院，安徽合肥 230026

收稿日期:2014-09-17 修回日期:2015-03-20 接受日期:2015-03-20 出版日期:2015-03-20 发布日期:2015-03-20
通讯作者: 杜少甫
作者简介:朱丽丽，女，1986年生，博士生. 研究方向：碳排放，公平关切. E-mail: zhulil@mail.ustc.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金(71271199),新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-13-0538)资助.

Supply chain optimization based on Shapley fair theory

ZHU Lili, SHI Yucheng, ZHU Jiaang, DU Shaofu

School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China

Received:2014-09-17 Revised:2015-03-20 Accepted:2015-03-20 Online:2015-03-20 Published:2015-03-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在1个供应商和2个零售商的供应链系统中，运用Shapley公平分配理论研究零售商的公平关切行为对供应链系统及各成员决策的影响.研究发现,零售商的公平关切行为导致供应商最优批发价降低，相应的零售商的最优订货量增大.同时，零售商的公平关切行为还增大了零售商和供应链整体的利润以及零售商占整个供应链利润的份额，提高了供应链系统运行的效率.

关键词: 供应链管理, 公平关切, Shapley值, 行为运筹

Abstract: A supply chain system with one supplier and two homogeneous retailers was considered to investigate the influence of retailers fairness concern on the supply chain and its members decision by using the Shapley fair distribution theory. Through modeling and behavioral analysis, it was found that retailers fairness concern will reduce suppliers optimal wholesale price and improves retailers own optimal order quantity in equilibrium. Besides, retailers fairness concern also increases their profit shares as well as channel profits, which leads to a higher supply chain efficiency.

Key words: supply chain management, fairness concern, Shapley value, behavioral operations

中图分类号:

TP391.9
C93

朱丽丽，时育成，朱贾昂，杜少甫. 基于Shapley值公平参考框架的供应链优化[J]. 中国科学技术大学学报, 2015, 45(6): 497-506.

ZHU Lili, SHI Yucheng, ZHU Jiaang, DU Shaofu. Supply chain optimization based on Shapley fair theory[J]. Journal of University of Science and Technology of China, 2015, 45(6): 497-506.

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基于Shapley值公平参考框架的供应链优化

Supply chain optimization based on Shapley fair theory

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