Analysis of the evolutionary game of reward-based crowdfunding platforms and entrepreneurs

doi:10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2017.06.010

Abstract

Abstract: To investigate the selection mechanism of the reward-based crowdfunding platform operation mode, a game model was developed by employing the evolutionary game theory. With this model the evolutionary dynamic stability of the selection for every stakeholder’s strategy was analyzed, and critical factors that determine the selection mechanism of the reward-based crowdfunding platform operation mode were explored by means of numerical simulation. The main result indicates that the key factor influencing the selection mechanism contains the following five dimensions: entrepreneurs’ demand for financing, crowdfunding platform service rates, service efficiency of the crowdfunding platform, opportunity cost of the crowdfunding platform to provide high quality services and government regulation of the reward-based crowdfunding market.

Key words: reward-based crwodfunding platform, evolutionary game, operation mode

CLC Number:

F224.32

DENG Biteng, ZHAO Zheng. Analysis of the evolutionary game of reward-based crowdfunding platforms and entrepreneurs[J]. Journal of University of Science and Technology of China, 2017, 47(6): 514-523.

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