奖励式众筹平台与项目发起人的演化博弈

doi:10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2017.06.010

中国科学技术大学学报 ›› 2017, Vol. 47 ›› Issue (6): 514-523.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2017.06.010

奖励式众筹平台与项目发起人的演化博弈

邓必腾，赵征

中国科学技术大学管理学院，安徽合肥 230026

收稿日期:2016-12-15 修回日期:2017-04-12 出版日期:2017-06-30 发布日期:2017-06-30
通讯作者: 赵征
作者简介:邓必腾，男，1990年生，硕士.研究方向：金融，博弈论.E-mail:windy7@mail.ustc.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家科技支撑计划（2014BAH27F02）资助.

Analysis of the evolutionary game of reward-based crowdfunding platforms and entrepreneurs

DENG Biteng, ZHAO Zheng

School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China

Received:2016-12-15 Revised:2017-04-12 Online:2017-06-30 Published:2017-06-30

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为研究奖励式众筹平台运作模式选择行为的决策机理，运用演化博弈理论的分析方法，构建奖励式众筹模式下奖励式众筹平台与项目发起人策略行为的演化博弈模型，对各利益主体策略的选择进行了演化动态稳定性分析，并通过数值仿真探求影响奖励式众筹平台运作模式选择的关键因素.研究表明：项目发起人的融资需求量，众筹平台收取的服务费率，众筹平台提供高服务的效率，众筹平台提供高服务的机会成本以及政府对众筹行业的监管程度是影响奖励式众筹平台运作模式的关键因素.

关键词: 奖励式众筹平台, 演化博弈, 运作模式

Abstract: To investigate the selection mechanism of the reward-based crowdfunding platform operation mode, a game model was developed by employing the evolutionary game theory. With this model the evolutionary dynamic stability of the selection for every stakeholder’s strategy was analyzed, and critical factors that determine the selection mechanism of the reward-based crowdfunding platform operation mode were explored by means of numerical simulation. The main result indicates that the key factor influencing the selection mechanism contains the following five dimensions: entrepreneurs’ demand for financing, crowdfunding platform service rates, service efficiency of the crowdfunding platform, opportunity cost of the crowdfunding platform to provide high quality services and government regulation of the reward-based crowdfunding market.

Key words: reward-based crwodfunding platform, evolutionary game, operation mode

中图分类号:

F224.32

邓必腾，赵征. 奖励式众筹平台与项目发起人的演化博弈[J]. 中国科学技术大学学报, 2017, 47(6): 514-523.

DENG Biteng, ZHAO Zheng. Analysis of the evolutionary game of reward-based crowdfunding platforms and entrepreneurs[J]. Journal of University of Science and Technology of China, 2017, 47(6): 514-523.

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奖励式众筹平台与项目发起人的演化博弈

Analysis of the evolutionary game of reward-based crowdfunding platforms and entrepreneurs

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