同时考虑技术溢出和产品替代的企业合作创新博弈

doi:10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2016.11.010

中国科学技术大学学报 ›› 2016, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (11): 946-953.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2016.11.010

• 论著 • 上一篇

同时考虑技术溢出和产品替代的企业合作创新博弈

宋建，梁樑，张保丰

1.中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥 230026; 2.合肥工业大学管理学院,安徽合肥 230001

收稿日期:2015-11-13 修回日期:2016-04-10 接受日期:2016-04-10 出版日期:2016-04-10 发布日期:2016-04-10
通讯作者: 张保丰
作者简介:宋建，男，1988年生，博士. 研究方向：供应链管理、决策分析. E-mail: roysj@mail.ustc.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金（71110107024）资助.

Game on cooperative innovation with both technology spillover and product substitution

SONG Jian, LIANG Liang, ZHANG Baofeng

1.School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China; 2.School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230001, China

Received:2015-11-13 Revised:2016-04-10 Accepted:2016-04-10 Online:2016-04-10 Published:2016-04-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 考虑一个由制造商寡头组成的市场系统，研究非对称性假设下技术溢出和产品替代对系统成员两阶段合作创新博弈行为的影响.结果发现：合作方的技术溢出能够有效刺激企业的技术创新和产品生产；而其产品替代效应则会抑制企业的创新与生产积极性；就单个企业而言，因为着眼于自身利益最大化，只有当合作方的技术溢出水平和产品替代程度足够高时，才会有参与全合作的动力，从而实现成员企业创新与生产活动的统一协调；而从系统利润的角度来看，在任何情形下创新与生产的两阶段全合作模式均优于单阶段半合作模式.因此，建立科学的系统收益分配机制，成员企业便愿意选择全合作模式.

关键词: 非对称性, 技术溢出, 产品替代, 合作创新, 博弈

Abstract: A system consisting of duopoly was proposed to explore how the asymmetric technology spillover and product substitution impact the cooperation in innovation and production stages. The mathematical and computational results show that technology spillover induces innovation investment and production. However, product substitution has a negative on the optimal innovation and production decisions. For a company maximizing his profits, only when both technology spillover and product substitution are high enough can the company have motivation to cooperate. It is always more beneficial for the system in full-collusion with cooperation in both innovation and production than in semi-collusion with only cooperation in innovation, which suggests that a well-designed revenue-allocation mechanism can motivate the duopoly to carry on full-collusion.

Key words: asymmetry, technology spillover, product substitution, cooperative innovation, game

中图分类号:

F224.

宋建，梁樑，张保丰. 同时考虑技术溢出和产品替代的企业合作创新博弈[J]. 中国科学技术大学学报, 2016, 46(11): 946-953.

SONG Jian, LIANG Liang, ZHANG Baofeng. Game on cooperative innovation with both technology spillover and product substitution[J]. Journal of University of Science and Technology of China, 2016, 46(11): 946-953.

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同时考虑技术溢出和产品替代的企业合作创新博弈

Game on cooperative innovation with both technology spillover and product substitution

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