中国科学技术大学学报 ›› 2016, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (12): 1030-1035.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2016.12.010

• 论著 • 上一篇    

双边平台的性能投资与定价

梁玉婉   

  1. 中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥 230026
  • 收稿日期:2015-11-09 修回日期:2016-03-25 接受日期:2016-03-25 出版日期:2016-03-25 发布日期:2016-03-25
  • 通讯作者: 梁玉婉
  • 作者简介:梁玉婉(通讯作者),女,1988年生,硕士. 研究方向:服务运作管理. E-mail: liayuwan13@mail.ustc.edu.cn

Two-sided platforms performance investment and pricing

LIANG Yuwan   

  1. School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
  • Received:2015-11-09 Revised:2016-03-25 Accepted:2016-03-25 Online:2016-03-25 Published:2016-03-25

摘要: 在双边平台的发展过程中,平台的管理者要做的一个重要决策就是决定平台的性能投资水平.较高的性能水平有利于吸引更多的用户,但是它往往需要开发商进行更高的投资才能融入这个平台.这里建立了探索平台性能投资与定价的模型.研究发现,平台的性能投资与定价策略取决于两种不同的预期:有利预期和不利预期.在有利预期情况下,管理者只需要根据利润函数求出最优性能投资和定价;在不利预期情况下,管理者可以采取开发商补贴策略或用户吸引策略来消除不利预期并最大化利润.

关键词: 双边平台, 网络外部性, 平台性能, 定价

Abstract: In the development of two-sided platforms, managers of platforms must decide what level of platform performance to invest. Higher performance is helpful to attract more users, but it often requires developers to make large investment to participate. Based on this, a model was established to explore platforms performance investment and pricing. The result shows that platforms performance investment and pricing are driven by two different expectations, favorable and unfavorable expectation. Under favorable expectation, managers only need to find the optimal performance and pricing according to investment profit function; under unfavorable expectation, managers can adopt seller subsidy strategy or buyer attraction strategy to eliminate the unfavorable expectations and maximize profits.

Key words: two-sided platform, network externality, platform performance, pricing

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